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No way of life can be entirely free from inflicting harm on 
others. The Vegan Society characterizes veganism as seek-
ing to exclude all exploitation of animals “as far as is possible 
and practicable.” Yet the dietary implications of this precept 
are not as straightforward as many assume. In Duty and the 
Beast, Andy Lamey confronts arguments for what he calls new 
omnivorism – recent arguments that profess to undermine the 
moral injunction against eating meat that is so prominent in 
the animal protection (animal rights) movement. Instead of re-
jecting animal protection as such, the new critics claim that in 
the pursuit of this objective the consumption of some meat is 
permissible or even obligatory.
Very sensibly, Lamey defines the vegan diet in terms of a 
commitment to reducing harm to animals rather than as a dog-
matic set of dietary prohibitions. To do the contrary, it seems 
to me, runs the risk of turning veganism into a cult of purity 
instead of a rationally defensible, empirically based means to 
a just end. The question that runs through this book is whether 
the vegan commitment always requires abstaining from meat.
In the course of his wide-ranging study, Lamey tackles the 
issue of death as a harm to animals and delves into “burger 
veganism,” the doctrine of double effect, Temple Grandin’s 
“humane” slaughter, the cognition of chickens, “logic of the 
larder” arguments (that meat-eating benefits animals by bring-
ing them into existence), alleged plant consciousness, and in vi-
tro (lab) meat. I will touch on only some of these matters here.
Lamey considers the harm that death is for persons (self-con-
scious individuals, who are moral agents and have a conception 
of themselves as existing through time) versus the harm it is 
for the – hypothetically – merely sentient (who are simply con-
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scious and with the ability to experience pleasure and pain). He 
argues for a “time-relative interest” account of the wrongness 
of killing. Because they lack the quality of future goods that 
persons have in prospect and because psychologically they are 
only weakly related to their future selves, the death of a merely 
sentient being is not nearly as bad as that of a person. Indeed, 
Lamey judges that the harm done by killing a merely sentient 
animal is less than that done by killing a late-term human fe-
tus. Still, he maintains, even this lesser harm would seldom be 
justifiable in terms of providing food, since people normally 
have alternative sources of nourishment.
But are most birds and mammals merely sentient? And can 
we impartially judge the value of their lives? Not only do we 
have a very imperfect grasp of animal minds in all their va-
riety, but our natural anthropocentric bias makes it very dif-
ficult to know whether it is really better to be a human be-
ing dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. After examining evidence 
about the cognition of chickens, an animal frequently viewed 
as particularly dim-witted, Lamey concludes that they possess 
a form of primitive self-consciousness that includes some sense 
of existing through time. This means they have a fairly strong 
interest in not being killed, one that cannot be overridden by 
the relatively trivial pleasure humans derive from eating them.
The cornerstone of what Lamey labels “burger veganism” is 
an article by Steven L. Davis (2003). Davis quotes Tom Regan 
as saying: “Whenever we find ourselves in a situation where 
all the options at hand will produce some harm to those who 
are innocent, we must choose that option that will result in the 
least total sum of harm” – which Regan calls the “minimize 
harm principle.” Based on a couple of empirical studies, Da-
vis argues that, because of the large numbers of field animals 
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killed in the production of crops, a commitment to this prin-
ciple may require us to reject abstention from meat in favour of 
an omnivorous diet that includes grass-fed herbivores raised in 
“pasture-forage” systems. Hence “burger veganism.”
In fact, Davis badly misreads Regan. Although Regan de-
fends the “harm principle” (that we have a direct prima facie 
duty not to harm individuals who have an experiential welfare), 
he only mentions the “minimize harm principle” in order im-
mediately to reject it (Regan 1983: 302). Interpreted as a cal-
culation of aggregate welfare, it is incompatible with Regan’s 
own view, which insists on respecting the rights of individual 
subjects-of-a-life. Instead, for situations where we cannot avoid 
harming some innocents, Regan formulates the miniride (min-
imize overriding) and worse-off principles. Even so, it may still 
be the case, as Davis contends, that an all-plant diet typically 
results in more animal deaths than some particular kind of om-
nivorous diet does.
As Lamey notes, Gaverick Matheny (2003) has found a large 
hole in Davis’s arithmetic. Davis has failed to take into account 
that much less land is required to feed a given number of people 
on an all-plant diet. When this mistake is rectified, says Ma-
theny, a plant diet is seen to result in significantly fewer animal 
deaths. For his part, Lamey finds that Davis has greatly over-
estimated the number of mice killed directly by harvesters; it 
turns out that most mice mortality results from predation by 
other animals after crop harvesting. Lamey also notes a faulty 
assumption in the calculation underlying Michael Archer’s 
(2011) burger-vegan claim about the number of mice poisoned 
by farmers during mouse plagues in Australia.
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Lamey makes the point that studies show wide variation in 
the effects of harvesting practices on different wild animal spe-
cies, so that it is difficult to generalize about mortality rates. 
For example, some studies show that changes in particular 
populations in cultivated areas are the result of migration in 
and out of these areas and not the result of higher mortality in 
cultivated areas.
As Lamey and Bob Fischer (2018) have stressed, the mor-
al import of empirical evidence about animal deaths in plant 
agriculture, difficult as such evidence is to come by, depends 
on answers to questions that are largely philosophical. Are we 
morally responsible for the death of a mouse killed by an owl 
after a harvester has removed the crop from a field? What if the 
mouse would not have existed in the first place if not for the 
shelter for mice provided by the crop? Is the short life of the 
average wild mouse on balance positive or negative in terms of 
experiences, and how does that affect our assessment of how 
harmful its death is? Should we factor in the benefit to the owl 
of feasting on the mouse? Do some animals count more than 
others because of their greater cognitive capacities? Do insects 
count at all? Do we have an obligation to police the natural 
world in order to minimize suffering?
One crucial philosophical issue arises from the fact that 
many of the deaths of wild animals in crop production are un-
intended, even if foreseen. Davis counts these deaths as moral-
ly equivalent to the intended deaths of farmed animals. Lamey 
devotes a chapter (“The Dinner of Double Effect”) to arguing 
for what he calls an animal-friendly version of the doctrine of 
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All this does not factor in the human and environmental 
costs of animal agriculture, including the spread of disease, the 
toll on slaughterhouse workers, water pollution, soil erosion, 
deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and climate change. A long 
list of zoonotic outbreaks, including pandemics, is linked to 
animal agriculture or the exploitation of wildlife.
Most of us have heard the refrain “Plants have feelings too” 
used as a provocative response to vegetarians/vegans. If true, 
the practical import for a commitment to reducing the harm 
we do might be profound. The fact that plants are highly sensi-
tive to their environments and respond to them in remarkably 
complex ways has previously led some philosophers to argue 
that plants have intrinsic value and merit our moral concern. 
For instance, Paul Taylor (1986) ascribes equal worth to all liv-
ing organisms on the basis that each is a “teleological center of 
life” – a unified system of goal-oriented activities – whether or 
not it is conscious. But, he says, the fact that animals can suf-
fer and plants cannot means it is less wrong to kill a plant to 
satisfy our needs than to kill a sentient animal. By contrast, the 
new field of so-called “plant neurobiology” often involves more 
radical claims: that plants think, that they display intelligence 
and are sentient – e.g., Mancuso and Viola (2015).
Lamey examines the key concepts and the evidence. He con-
cludes that “plant thinkers” have provided no good reason to 
believe that plants experience the world subjectively, in a man-
ner that would qualify as sentience in the language of animal 
protection. Even the possession of some rudimentary form of 
consciousness by plants would not raise them to the same moral 
status as sentient animals. Further, any obligation to minimize 
harm to plants for their own sakes would tell against raising 
animals for meat, given the amount of land cleared for animal 
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agriculture and since each farmed animal consumes, injures, 
and/or kills many plants.
Lamey does not oppose all meat consumption. The concept 
of “meat”, he argues, can properly encompass flesh replace-
ments that are not carved directly from the bodies of animals. 
He defends in vitro, or lab, meat against protectionist critics 
who contend that the consumption of in vitro meat furthers 
the ideology that animals are edible or who contend that such 
consumption exhibits an inappropriate attitude of irreverence 
toward the bodies of animals.
New omnivorism poses a series of challenges to the animal 
protection movement as traditionally understood. While they 
may have originated in good faith (e.g., via investigation into 
the numbers of field animals killed in crop production or into 
the complex responses of plants to their environments), these 
challenges can be wielded less scrupulously by others for ideo-
logical purposes. As such, new omnivorism presents a task for 
animal protectionists on both fronts: to engage seriously with 
the serious arguments, in the interest of better understanding, 
and to combat the latest apologies for animal exploitation.
It is said that Persian carpets contain intentional flaws to ac-
knowledge that only the works of God can be perfect. Who 
knew that the august Cambridge University Press would dis-
play so much religious zeal – this book contains a surprising 
number of typos. But they do not detract from the insightful 
arguments woven by the author. A commitment to the core 
idea of veganism raises numerous philosophical, scientific, and 
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